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STUDENT NOTES
Permanent Injury: General or Special Damage
With the recent adoption of the West Virginia Rules of Civil
Procedure, the function of the pleadings in an action is to give
notice. Formulation of the issues for trial is now left largely to
deposition and discovery practice under Rules 26 through 37, and
pre-trial conferences under Rule 16. An exception to this concept
of notice-pleading is Rule 9, which requires that some items be
pleaded specially. The scope of this note is to examine one
subdivision of the rule: "special damage." In particular, the ex-
amination of this subdivision will be directed to the inquiry of
whether a permanent injury to the person is a special damage.
Rule 9(g) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure
provides that "when items of special damage are claimed,
they shall be specifically stated." Obviously, this subdivision of
the rule recognizes a well-established distinction between general
and special damage. Items of general damage need not be pleaded
with particularity, but items of special damage must be specifically
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stated.' Since the requirement of Rule 9(g) is the same as prior
West Virginia practice,2 an analysis of the earlier West Virginia
decisions would seem to be appropriate.
From an examination of the cases decided by the West Virginia
court, it appears that the issue of whether a permanent injury
to the person is a special damage is an open question in this state.
However, it may be germane to see what the West Virginia court
has said with regard to the distinction between general and spe-
cial damage, so that some indication may be derived as to the court's
probable position on the issue of permanent injury.
The early case of Pegram v. Stortz3 laid down the distinction
between general and special damage. In that case, the court
adopted a broad, general test. It was held that general damages
must not only be the natural and proximate result of the act
complained of, but they must also be the necessary result of such
act. On the other hand, special damages were held to be the
natural consequences, but not the necessary consequences, of the
act.
In Yeager v. City of Bluefield,4 the court said that the rule,
where general damages are claimed, is that the declaration need
not allege the particular injury which is sought to be proved.
This was an action of trespass on the case against a city for per-
sonal injuries resulting from a defect in a street crossing. The
declaration alleged that the plaintiff fell, and, as a result of the
fall, he was "greatly injured, bruised, wounded and crippled." The
court held that the declaration was not defective because it did
not state the particular injury, namely, a broken leg. The court
recognized that the rule was different where special damages were
sought. The court, speaking through Judge Brannon, stated that
if the plaintiff were engaged in any business requiring specially
the use of the limb, and the injury rendered him incapable of per-
forming that business, then the injury to that limb should be spe-
cified, as its result or consequences in the particular case would
be loss of business.
The liberal approach taken by the court in the Yeager case,
where general damages were involved, was seemingly limited in
2 MooRE, FEDaA PnAcTicE 19.08 (2d ed. 1961).2 Reporters' Original Note to Rule 9 of the W. VA. R.C.P.
3 31 W. Va. 220, 6 S.E. 485 (1888).
4 40 W. Va. 484,21 S.E. 752 (1895).
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Waters v. City of Morgantown.' In the Waters case, the court
said that general damages included only those damages which
necessarily and immediately flow from the injury. In that case,
the allegation in the declaration read as follows:
" . . . on account of the accident ... she suffered fractures
in her right leg, right shoulder bone and right tenth rib; that
muscles at the back of her neck and in her abdomen were
torn loose and injured, and that by reason thereof she be-
came sick, sore, lame and disabled and suffered and still
suffers intense physical pain in the back of her head and in
her abdominal regions .... "
The plaintiff introduced evidence tending to show that insanity
resulted from the accident. The court held that the admission of
this evidence was error in the absence of a specific allegation that
insanity resulted from the injuries. The court cited with approval
Gumb v. Twenty-Third St. Ry. Co.,6 wherein it was stated:
"When a plaintiff alleges that his person has been injured,
and proves the allegation, the law implies damages, and he
may recover such as necessarily and immediately flow from
the injury, (which are called general damages,) under a
general allegation that damages were sustained; but if he seeks
to recover damages for consequences which do not neces-
sarily and immediately flow from the injury, (which are called
special damages,) he must allege the special damages which
he seeks to recover.
A close comparison of the Yeager case' with the Waters case8
shows that similar factual situations were involved. However, while
the court held in the Yeager case that it was permissible to prove
the particular injury (a broken leg) without alleging the par-
ticular injury, it was held in the Waters case that the particular
injury (insanity) could not be proved in the absence of a specific
allegation.
Although it would seem at first glance that these holdings may
be inconsistent, careful inspection seems to negate this assump-
tion. Certainly, the defendant should be given a fair opportunity
to prepare his defense, and not be taken by surprise at the trial.
In the Yeager case, from the allegation that the plaintiff was "crip-
5 110 W. Va. 43, 156 S. E. 837 (1931)
6 114 N.Y. 411,21 N.E. 993, 994 (1889).
7 40 W. Va. 484,21 S.E. 752 (1895).
8 110 W. Va. 43, 156 S.E. 837 (1931).
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pled," and from the description of the facts creating the cause of
action, the defendant could reasonably expect that the plaintiff
might have suffered a break of some nature from the fall. On
the other hand, it would surely be an extradordinary circumstance
for the plaintiff to become insane as a result of a fall, as in the
Waters case. The allegations that "muscles at the back of her
neck ...were torn loose" and that she "suffered and still suf-
fers intense physical pain in the back of her head" would seem-
ingly give no indication to the defendant that the plaintiff would
seek to show that insanity resulted. Since insanity would not be
a necessary consequence of a fall, it would seem that the court
correctly held that this condition was special damage, requiring
that it be specifically stated.
A recent federal district court decision is consistent with the
requirement that the plaintiffs condition must be a necessary
consequence of the defendant's wrongful act to be an item of
general damage. In that case, the plaintiff brought an action
against the United States under the Federal Torts Claims Act
for injuries sustained when the plaintiff was hit by the closing
doors of an elevator in a federal court house. It was alleged in the
complaint that the plaintiff sustained "severe, permanent, painful
and disabling bodily and personal injuries to her chest, breasts,
back, sides, spine and spinal cord, nerves and nervous system,
arms, hands and legs." The plaintiff introduced evidence showing
that he had been stricken with cancer. Although the plaintiff's
testimony concerning cancer was admitted without objection, the
court recognized that cancer was an item of special damage.
The test for the distinction between general and special damage
is easily stated. The difficulty arises in its application to a par-
ticular factual situation. In Raines v. Faulkner,° the West Vir-
ginia court gave an indication of what it considered to be damages
which necessarily flowed from a particular injury. This case in-
volved an action for an assault and battery. The court held that
humiliation, shame, dishonor, terror, mental pain and anguish to
the plaintiff would naturally and necessarily flow from the nature
of defendant's assault upon the plaintiff; therefore, these items
of damage could be recovered under a general allegation of dam-
ages.
9 Elgin v. United States, 89 F. Supp. 195 (W.D. Mo. 1950).
10131 W. Va. 10 48 S.E. 2d 393 (1947). The plaintiff also sought
punitive damages, which were pleaded specially.
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Although there are no West Virginia cases dealing with the
pleading of permanent injury to the person, numerous other jur-
isdictions have passed on the issue. The cases are in conflict as
to whether the permanency of injuries must be alleged in order to
allow recovery therefor." The courts' 2 are confronted with two
conflicting considerations in determining the question: (1) the
consideration that the plaintiff should be permitted to recover all
that he is fairly entitled to; and (2) the defendant should be given
a fair opportunity to know the elements of the plaintiff's claim
so as to be adequately able to prepare his defense, and not be
taken by surprise. The cases," into which the problem has been
presented, fall into three groups: (1) Apparently the majority
rule is that damages for the permanency of the injury are recov-
erable under a general allegation of damages, without specifically
pleading the fact of permanency. 4 In many of these cases, this
rule is expressly stated; other cases have tacitly allowed recovery
of damages for permanent injuries in the absence of any specific
allegation that the injuries complained of were permanent.'" (2)
Other cases take the view that damages for permanent injuries
may not be recovered under a general allegation of damages, with-
out specifically pleading the fact of permanency." These cases
go on the theory that damages for such injuries are in the nature
of special damages, which must be specifically pleaded to allow
recovery therefor."' However, under this view, the word "perma-
nent" need not be used in alleging the permanency of the dam-
ages.'" Any equivalent expressions are sufficient. Thus, an allega-
tion that the plaintiff will be disabled the rest of his life has been
held a sufficient allegation of permanency.' 9 (3) A third line
of authorities holds that unless facts from which the permanency
of the injury will necessarily be implied are alleged, there must
be a special averment that the injuries are permanent in order to
let in proof to that effect.2" This is really a qualification of the
I Annot., 68 A.L.R. 490 (1930).
' 2 Pauly v. McCarthy, 109 Utah 431, 184 P.2d 123, 128 (1947); see
generally, Annot., 68 A.L.R. 490 (1930).
13Ibid.
14 Walton v. Light, 181 Va. 609, 26 S.E.2d 29 (1943).
15 McLean v. Lewiston, 8 Idaho 472, 69 Pac. 478 (1902).
16 Denton v. Ordway, 108 Iowa 487, 79 N.W. 271 (1899).
17Pauly v. McCarthy, 109 Utah 431 184 P.2d 123, 128 (1947); see
generally, Annot., 68 A.L.R. 490, 495 (1930).
8 Annot., 68 A.L.R. 490,495 (1930).
19 Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. v. Ward, 135 M1. 511, 26 N.E. 520 (1891).20 Baldassare v. Pagliaro, 86 R.I. 461, 136 A.2d 685 (1957).
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second rule. Under this rule, the fact that permanency may pos-
sibly or even probably follow from the nature of the injury is not
sufficient to allow recovery in the absence of a specific allegation
of permanency.
Virginia has solved the problem by holding that permanent in-
juries may be recovered under a general allegation of damages.
In Walton v. Light,2' the Virginia court recognized that the weight
of authority is that damages for the permanency of an injury are
recoverable under a general allegation of damages, without spe-
cifically alleging the fact of permanency. The court accepted this
view and held that the plaintiff could introduce evidence of per-
manent injury under an allegation of "serious bodily injuries" in
a notice of motion for judgment proceeding.
Rule 84 of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that the forms contained in the Appendix of Forms are sufficient
under the Rules. The ad damnum clause in Official Form 9 is as
follows: "As a result plaintiff was thrown down and had his leg
broken and was otherwise injured, was prevented from transact-
ing his business, suffered great pain of body and mind, and incurred
expenses and medical attention and hospitalization in the sum of
one thousand dollars." No mention is made in the form of perma-
nent injury. In pleading the physical effects of the injury, the
form mentions a particular injury, namely, a broken leg. The form
goes on to provide "and was otherwise injured." Thus, it appears
that the form contemplates the pleading of injuries both specifically
and generally. Exactly what may be proved under the general
allegation after pleading specific injuries remains to be seen.
Unless the West Virginia court adopts the liberal spirit of the
Rules, it may very well cause the plaintiff to be limited at the
trial to the injuries which are specifically described, on the prin-
ciple that the particular controls the general." Pleading generally
the injury will also encounter the risk that the court may say
that it authorizes proof only of those effects which would "neces-
sarily and immediately" flow from the kind of blow or impact
described. This has been the test used by the West Virginia court
in the past where general damages are alleged. 3
21 181 Va. 609,26 S.E.2d 29 (1943).
22 McCoRmcK, DAMAES 35 (1935).
23 Waters v. City of Morgantown, 110 W. Va. 43, 156 S.E. 837 (1931).
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Obviously, the safest approach to follow when a permanent in-
jury is involved is to plead that the injury is permanent. In actions
for personal injuries, the very description in the complaint of the
facts creating the cause of action comprises some description of
the wound or injury to the plaintiff. How far that description of
the wounding or breaking of the body gives notice, of itself, of
a claim for permanent injury, obviously depends upon the serious-
ness of the particular bodily hurt as described. For example,
where the plaintiff's claim is based upon a serious automobile col-
lision, permanent injury might correctly be said to "necessarily and
immediately" flow from the impact. On the other hand, where
the facts showing the cause of action would not indicate to the
defendant that the plaintiff might be permanently injured, the
court may hold that a permanent injury would not "necessarily"
flow from the impact; thus, any permanency of injury should be
pleaded specifically to give the defendant notice.
Nick George Zegrea
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